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"WHEN SMOKE GETS IN YOUR EYES":
MYTH AND REALITY ABOUT THE SYNTHESIS
OF PRIVATE COUNSEL AND PUBLIC CLIENT
John C. Coffee, Jr.

INTRODUCTION

A recurring fallacy in any debate over legal ethics or public policy is
to assume that the particular problem under examination is unique
and unprecedented. Expand one's field of vision, and precedents and
analogs quickly turn up. This rule applies with special force to the
debate over retention by state attorneys general of private counsel to
represent them on a contingent fee basis in the recent litigation
against the tobacco industry.' Because this litigation produced a
highly successful outcome, while most private litigation against the tobacco industry has not, some are led to the conclusion that this combination of private counsel and public client is potent, unique, and
probably troubling - or, at the least, new and noteworthy.
A wider-angled perspective on contemporary complex litigation
suggests, however, that this newness is illusory. Although there are
likely efficiencies associated with this combination (as with most other
bargains struck in the market between sophisticated parties), the party
most likely to be injured or short-changed by this relationship is not
the defendant, but rather the state as a client. Thus, although this
brief comment disputes the contentions made by others in this symposium that the combination of private counsel and public client circumvents legislative authority or distorts prosecutorial discretion, it does
conclude that there are high agency costs associated with this relationship and that these agency problems justify enhanced ethical
restraints.
Two preliminary observations are necessary at the outset. First, the
state attorneys general tobacco litigation (SAG tobacco litigation) did
generate one major innovation, but it was substantive, rather than
procedural. This was the acceptance, at least for purposes of the to1. In 1998, some 46 states entered into a Master Settlement Agreement with the tobacco industry that provided for payments of $206 billion to be made to the states over a period of years.
See MeClendon v. Ga. Dep't of Community Health, 261 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2001) (discussing
terms of settlement).
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bacco settlement, of state standing to sue for recoupment of expenses
incurred by the state as the result of injuries suffered by its citizens.
When private parties (such as unions and health maintenance organizations) have asserted similar claims, they have been judicially rebuffed on the ground that their injuries were too remote. 2 Hence,
tobacco litigation did result in the implicit recognition of a new substantive principle of law that could be extended to related dangerous
products (such as handguns or lead paint). Yet, the early evidence is
that this principle has encountered stiff judicial resistance outside the
3
context of state tobacco litigation.
Second, on the procedural side, the state tobacco litigation involved
the hiring of private counsel on a contingent fee basis by a majority of
the state attorneys general. Although some may view this as either
ethically dubious or politically dangerous, the one thing it cannot
fairly be called is novel. Similar combinations of public and private
counsel regularly form in other functionally similar litigation contexts.
For example, in the context of federal securities litigation, the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) has given control
of securities class actions to a "lead plaintiff," who is defined by the
statute to be the person or entity with the largest financial interest in
4
the action.
Increasingly, the lead plaintiff proves to be a state pension fund,
which in turn hires a private law firm (indeed many of the same law
firms as appeared for plaintiffs in the SAG tobacco litigation) on a
contingent fee basis. While federal securities class action litigation is
the best example of this union of public entities with private litigation
counsel, it is far from the only example. One of the largest and most
discussed cases of recent years has been the Justice Department's antitrust litigation against Microsoft Corporation. Not only did the Justice
Department hire David Boies as their trial lawyer,5 but when some of
2. See e.g., SEIU Helath & Welfare Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 249 F.3d 1068 (D.C. Cir.
2001); Ass'n of Wash. Pub. Hosp. Dists. v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 241 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 2001);
Allegheny Cen. Hosp. v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429 (3rd Cir. 2000) (finding plaintiffs to
lack standing to sue tobacco industry for expenses incurred by them relating to medical and
health costs).
3. See e.g., Camed County Bd. of Chosen Feeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24828 (3rd Cir. Nov. 16, 2001); Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 264 F.3d 21 (2nd Cir.
2000) (dismissing causes of action against manufacturers of hand guns on grounds of standing,
remoteness of injury, and lack of proximate causation).
4. See Section 21D (a)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 78 u4(a)(3)(B). See also In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 186 F.R.D. 214 (D.D.C. 1999) (explaining operation of lead plaintiff provision).
5. Mr. Boies's experience as a retained private counsel to the Federal government did not
begin with the Microsoft litigation. Years earlier, he was retained in an action brought by the
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the states refused to accept the settlement reached between Microsoft
and the Department of Justice, the State of California retained
Brendan Sullivan of Williams & Connolly to challenge the settlement,
while the Department of Justice hired Phillip Beck of the litigation6
boutique, Bartlit, Beck, Herman, Palenchar & Scott, as their counsel.
In short, as the stakes got higher, all sides turned to outside counsel.
The point in making this comparison with securities litigation is not
simply to challenge the assumption of uniqueness, but rather to identify a database that allows us to assess more cases over a longer time
period in order to evaluate both the potential for conflicts and corruption and the performance of this new marriage of convenience between public officials and the private plaintiffs' bar. It also supplies a
very different perspective on whether the use of contingent fee litigation is simply a mechanism for subverting legislative oversight and
funding.
II.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST TAXONOMY

Conflicts of interests are as inevitable as death and taxes. That they
exist only frames the real issue: How should they be dealt with? A
brief review of the conflict issues that have been perceived as arising
uniquely in SAG tobacco litigation shows that they have also arisen in
post-PSLRA securities litigation.
A.

Conflicts Over Counsel Selection

The most obvious potential conflict is probably that the state official
will select the private counsel most willing to bribe him with either an
under-the-table payment or a legally permissible political contribution. 7 The allegation that Texas Attorney General Dan Morales demanded a one million dollar bribe from the private counsel seeking to
represent Texas in the SAG tobacco litigation has received prominent
press coverage (and is the subject of an on-going criminal investiga8
tion), and it exemplifies this quintessential conflict.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. against Drexel, Burnham Lambert and Michael Milken, in
which Mr. Milken paid a settlement of $500 million. See Stephen Labaton, "Counting the Vote:
The New Gore Lawyer; A Man Who Vanquished Microsoft Takes on the G.O.P.," N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 2000, at p. A-23.
6. See Jonathan Groner, "Sullivan Will Lead California Into Battle Against Microsoft," NAT'L
L.J., Nov. 19, 2001, at p A-10.
7. See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991) (holding that a "quid pro quo is
necessary for a conviction when an official receives a campaign contribution, regardless of
whether it is a legitimate contribution.").
8. See Mark Curriden, Morales Case May Be Done in January;A.G. in Tobacco Case Has
Denied Wrongdoing, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 5, 2000, at 43A.
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Securities litigation has followed a similar pattern, or at least similar
allegations. In In re Cendent Corp., which ultimately resulted in the
largest class action settlement on record ($3.1 billion), one contender
for the position of lead counsel charged that two of the lead plaintiffs
(the New York State and New York City pension funds) had chosen as
their co-lead counsel two law firms that had been major campaign donors to the elected official who had sole discretion over each fund. 9 In
truth, both the New York State Pension Fund and the New York City
Pension Fund were each subject to the exclusive control and direction
of the New York State Comptroller and New York City Controller,
respectively. Although the district court in Cendant refused to accept
the contention that a quid pro quo was involved, it is at least curious
why one of the two co-lead counsels in Cendant, a major Philadelphia
plaintiff's firm, would otherwise wish to contribute to the political
campaign fund of the New York State Controller.10 Presumably, its
desire to fund good government could have been satisfied closer to
home.
While Cendant was a high profile case, it was not unique. A network of relationships exists between an increasingly national plaintiffs
bar and those state officials who have actual control over state and
municipal pension funds. A recent survey by one newspaper found
law firms in New York and Philadelphia contributed not only to local
state and municipal officials who could influence the choice of class
counsel on behalf of their pension fund, but they also contributed to
both sides in races for state treasurer in distant states." But if the
problem seems pervasive, the answers to it are obvious. First, one
could select counsel through a competitive bidding process; this is in
fact what the Cendant court did, although ostensibly at least for other
reasons. Second, one could substitute a non-partisan board of trustees
for the elected public official in order to minimize the role of political
contributions over counsel selection. Interestingly, several of the
states that are most active as lead plaintiffs in securities litigation have

9. See In re Cendant Corp., 182 F.R.D. 144, 146-148 (D.N.J. 1998); see also Diana B. Henriques, Conflicts over Conflicts: Class Action Lawyers Defend Their Political Contributions, N.Y.
TiMLS, July 30, 1998, at D-1.
10. See Kevin McCoy, Campaign Contributions or Conflicts of Interest, USA Today, Sept. 11,
2001, at 13 (finding that these law firms had contributed nearly $100,000 to campaigns for New
York State Comptroller since 1999 and had been appointed class counsel in two major class
actions in which New York state was serving as lead plaintiff).
11. Id. at p. lB. For example, this survey found that the plaintiff firms in New York, Philadelphia, and Boston contributed $32,000 to the winner and $21,500 to the loser in the last election
for Louisiana State Treasurer.
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such non-partisan boards: California (CalPERS), Wisconsin (SWIB),
and Florida.
Both of these solutions are open to criticism. Auctions are controversial and may dissuade state pension funds from serving as lead
plaintiffs if they cannot choose their own counsel. Similarly, the suggestion that control by an elected official be replaced by a non-partisan board of trustees may sound overly prophylactic to some.
Arguably, to insulate the pension fund in this fashion is far more antidemocratic than it is for an elected official to obtain funding from a
non-legislatively approved source. Still, such insulation can be justified by analogy to unelected city managers and civil service bureaucracies on the ground that some governmental functions are
inherently professional and non-political. If this principle is accepted,
the administration of a pension fund is a clear example that would fall
within it.
Nonetheless, the simplest solution may be an ethical one that does
not seek to change the structural control over the litigation decision.
The American Bar Association (ABA) has adopted the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, which contain Model Rule 7.6 (R.P.C. 7.6),
which restricts "pay to play" practices and effectively bars attorneys
and law firms from accepting government legal engagements if they
made or solicited political contributions "for the purpose of obtaining
the business. ' 12 This rule was largely modeled on an earlier rule imposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission on the municipal
securities industry. 13 Yet, at least until this proposed rule becomes
effective at the state level, there is reason to believe that "paying to
play" is and will remain the norm in those jurisdictions where the state
pension fund is subject to the direct control of elected officials. At
present, the evidence suggests that state bar groups are steering clear
of the ABA's new ethical rule on "pay-to-play" practices, and hence, a
norm of "business as usual" presumably remains in effect in the legal
marketplace. Even if the ABA rule were adopted by state bars, its
language does not prohibit political contributions or bar the attorney
12. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, R. 7.6 (1983); see also Malcolm A. Heinicke, The ABA Should Not Delay on Pay-to-Play:Regulating the Political Contributionsof Law-

yers to Government Officials Who Award Legal Contracts, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1523, 1526-27
(1997); Samantha M. Cohen, Playing-to-Play Is the New Rule of the Game: A Practical Implication of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1331 (1999).

13. Rule G-37 was adopted by the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board in 1994. See Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, Release No. 34-33868; File No. SR-MSRB-94-2, 59 Fed.
Reg. 17621 (April 13, 1994); see also Jon Jordan, The Regulation of "Pay-to-Play" and the Influence of Political Contributions in the Municipal Securities Industry, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L. REV.

489 (1999).

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:241

from accepting the engagement-except and unless the contribution
was made for the "purpose of obtaining" such engagement. Legal
minds will have little difficulty finding this rule inapplicable to the
facts of their case, based on the attorney's assertion that his or her
motivation was not political.
Within this context, R.P.C. 7.6 will not eliminate conflicts regarding
the selection of lead counsel. How serious a problem is this if our
principal focus is on the performance of lead counsel? Some evidence
suggests that securities class action settlements have been higher since
the passage of the PSLRA. While it may be risky to attribute this
increase to the lead plaintiff provision, it is noteworthy that the class
action that received the greatest press attention for its "pay-to-play"
practices (i.e., Cendant) also resulted in the largest class settlement in
history. Cynical as it may sound, it seems fair to generalize that the
attorneys who donate the most to the state controller of their choice
are probably among the most able litigators who are most likely to
maximize the state's recovery. "Paying to play" may be a barrier to
entry and result in cases being filed that would not otherwise be
brought, but it is far less clear that it results systematically in inferior
counsel becoming class counsel. Moreover, when class counsel is
compensated on the basis of a contingent fee calculated as a percentage of the recovery, class counsel's interests are fairly well aligned
with those of the class members that they are seeking to protect.
Thus, while contingent fees are often criticized as windfalls, the fairest
generalization is that, when determined on a percentage basis, they
act as an incentive to motivate the attorney to obtain a larger recovery, and they minimize the perverse incentive that can arise under the
lodestar formula 14 to run up hours and then settle on a basis that benefits the attorney more than the class that the attorney represents.
B.

Conflicts Between Public and Private Clients

Critics of the SAG tobacco litigation have raised the prospect that
the private attorney will face a conflict between the interests of the
attorney's private clients and his public clients. Why this might be so
is far from clear, as the SAG tobacco litigation did not result in any
recovery or other litigation benefits to individual plaintiffs. Nor, in
my judgment, were there opportunities in the SAG tobacco litigation
to trade off the interests of these two groups. In any event, the possibility of conflicts arising between private and public clients is not
14. See Lynn Hume, No Action on Pay-to-Play ABA Rule Little Interest in States, THE BOND
BUYER, September 19, 2000, at http://www.bondbuyer.com.
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unique to tobacco litigation. Indeed, by definition in securities class
actions, the private attorney is representing both public and private
clients. Inherently, this is precisely what a class action intends, which
is the aggregation of the largest possible number of claimants in order
to maximize the pressure on the defendant.
Two views are possible about the seriousness of this potential conflict. Those who see it as mild to trivial can point to the fact that the
lead plaintiff runs the securities class action; hence, the other class
members are subordinate to it. As a factual matter, the accuracy of
this assertion is debatable because once the class is certified (and possibly before), the lead plaintiff probably owes a fiduciary duty to the
class, and in any event, real control probably belongs to the class
counsel. The case law makes clear that the class counsel can in effect
fire the client who hired it and reach a settlement over its objections.1 5
From the opposite perspective, it can be argued that a real and serious
conflict between client and counsel exists as to whether the public entity should elect to serve as a lead plaintiff in a class action or whether
it should instead opt out and sue in an individual suit. Here, the interests of the private attorney will clearly favor the class action because
class counsel is typically rewarded handsomely by the court in successful class actions. If the typical fee award is somewhere around 30% in
securities class actions today, this means that the larger the class (and
hence, the larger the recovery), the larger the fee award to class counsel. 16 Yet large corporations and private institutional investors often
opt out and sue individually in the belief that they will do better individually than when their interests are submerged within the class.
Indeed, possibly the most noteworthy fact about the lead plaintiff
selection process is that since the passage of the PSLRA, private institutional investors have virtually never volunteered for this rolewhile they do sometimes opt out and sue individually. Although there
is little evidence as to how they do in these separate suits, a number of
empirical studies suggest that the class in a securities class action typically receives only between 5% and 10% of their estimated damages

15. See Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581 (3d Cir. 1999); see also John C. Coffee, Class
Action Accountability, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 407-410 (2000).
16. The leading studies of fee awards in securities class actions have been conducted by National Economic Research Associates (NERA), an economic consulting firm. Based on data
prior to the passage of the PSLRA, NERA found that the average fee award in securities class
actions was 31.71% and the median fee award was 33.33%. See Frederick Dunbar, Todd Foster,
Vinita Juneja, Denise Martin, RECENT TRENDS Ill: WHAT EXPLAINS SETrLEMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTiONS? (NERA, June 1995).
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in a settlement.' 7 There are understandable reasons for this (including exaggerated damage models that ignore the major problem of loss
causation in securities litigation), but it is at least a realistic hypothesis
that settlements in individual actions would award large claimants,
represented by able counsel, much higher damages than the same
plaintiffs would receive as their pro rata share of a class action.
Still, if the large client gains by opting out, the contingent fee plaintiff's attorney almost certainly loses. Suppose the public entity that
might serve as lead plaintiff owns 10% of the stock purchase during
the class period. At most, it will pay its attorney approximately one
third of its recovery in an individual action and if it opts out, this is
one third of ten percent (or 3-1/3%). Alternatively, if a large client
stays in the class, the class counsel may receive one third of the entire
class's recovery (i.e., one third of 100%, or 33-1/3% versus 3-1/3%).
Therefore, if an individual suit is a realistic option, a real conflict
emerges between the interests of the institutional investor who today
serves as lead plaintiff and the interests of class counsel, which conflict
"pay to play" practices aggravate.
C. Conflicts Over the Decision to Sue
As noted earlier, a stark contrast exists between the behavior of
private institutional investors (who virtually never sue in a class action) and public pension funds (who have been the primary lead plaintiffs since the passage of the PSLRA). Who is right? Mutual funds
and insurance companies view class litigation as a wasteful diversion
of managerial time, a source of potential liability, and above all, a
non-core business activity as to which they lack special expertise.
Conversely, state pension fund officials believe they have a fiduciary
duty to protect the assets in their pension fund and to sue to recover
for fraud.
Exacerbating this difference of opinion is the factor of political contributions. If the State Controller received $200,000 in lawful soft
money from law firm X, will the State Controller resist the request of
that law firm to allow it to represent the state in a class action that the
law firm wishes to file alleging securities fraud with the pension fund
17. The study finding that the average recovery is securities class actions amounts to only 5%
of shareholder losses was conducted by NERA and submitted to Congress during the hearings
preceding the passage of the PSLRA. See Frederick Dunbar & Vinita Juneja, RECENT TRENDS
II: WHAT EXPLAINS SETTLEMENT IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACrIONS? reprinted in PrivateLitigation Under the FederalSecurities Laws: HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on Securities of Senate

Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103rd Congress, 1st Sess. (June 17 and July
21, 1992) at 739-750. For a review and critique of these other studies, see James Cox, Making
Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 497, 501-506 (1997).
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serving as lead plaintiff. Arguably, the political contribution is the
price that the law firm pays to obtain a license to use the state's pension assets for litigation purposes. This incentive could imply that the
volume of class litigation in the United States will be inflated by political contributions (i.e., suits that would otherwise not be brought will
be brought).
How realistic is this danger? In the context of securities litigation,
this scenario seems unlikely. Here, one must recognize that a law suit
would probably have been filed in any event because even a 100 share
shareholder can file and maintain a securities class action. All that is
being disputed is the control of that litigation. Thus, what the political
contribution really buys is voting control over litigation that would
otherwise still be brought. But in the mass tort or consumer class action contexts, this scenario may be more valid. Finally, the context in
which it is most legitimately arguable that political contributions may
increase the volume of litigation is parens patriae litigation brought by
state attorneys general in non-class action suits. This is the one form
of action that could not generally be brought by someone else. But
even here, there is one braking force on excessive litigation: the plaintiff's attorney is only compensated if the attorney obtains a recovery.
Ironically, the contingent fee here becomes a virtue, not a vice, because it removes any incentive to induce the attorney general to bring
an action that the private attorney would not bring at his own expense. In this light, the danger of excess litigation is greatest when the
attorney is compensated on an hourly fee basis.

III.

THE POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY ARGUMENTS

Both critics and supporters seem to agree that "the most persuasive
explanation" for why state attorneys general retain private counsel on
a contingent fee basis is the "need to bypass the state legislature."18
Again, I tend to dissent to the extent that I see a more basic motivation. In the context of securities class action litigation, it becomes apparent that the legislature has had little objection to the now prevalent
system of self-financing such litigation through contingent fees. The
efficiency advantages are simply obvious and overwhelming.
A.

The Efficiency Advantages

Let us consider the position of a state pension fund that has incurred losses because of securities fraud. In the alternative, assume
18. See David A. Dana, Public Interest and Private Lawyers: Toward Normative Evaluation of
Parens Patriae Litigation By Contingent Fee, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 319 (2001).
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that the pension fund has had one small loss of one million dollars on
one investment, or that it has suffered a large loss of $50 million or
more on another investment. In theory, in either case, the pension
fund could call on the state attorney general to represent it or it could
retain in-house counsel. In the case of the small loss, the retention of
in-house counsel is clearly inefficient (either by the pension fund or
the state attorney general). It would clearly take multiple lawyers several years to handle the action (or, at least, such is the current elapsed
time to reach settlement in most securities class actions), and the one
million dollar loss is too small to justify this cost. Hence, it is more
efficient to aggregate the small losses of many claimants and sue on a
class basis. Only if the pension fund expected a continuing series of
small losses would it be sensible to hire an in-house expert on securities litigation, and, even then, the rate of fraud is likely to be highly
variable, thus ensuring that there will be peaks and valleys and no
continuing steady and even demand for the specialist's services.
The point here is that what makes the class action form and the use
of outside counsel attractive is less the small size (and limited funds)
of the typical class member than the small size of the typical losses.
Ultimately, aggregation of small losses is efficient, and even if the
large pension fund or other state agency could afford to sue, it is not
efficient to do so.
Now let us consider a larger, more catastrophic loss. Conceivably, if
it is not restored, the pension plan may become insolvent. If it is a
defined benefit plan, this loss falls on the state, which is ultimately
liable for the pension benefits that it has promised to its employees.
Even if it were a defined contribution plan, it seems politically inconceivable that a state would not try to compensate such a loss, rather
than see its former employees lose their expected retirement income.
The state agency could, of course, retain a law firm on either an hourly
basis or on a contingent fee basis. What it cannot do is handle the
matter on an in-house basis with civil service lawyers who lack the
requisite prior experience in a specialized field. This is a standard
"make or buy" decision that all economic firms face, and the case for
leasing talent from a specialist seems overwhelming here.
This need to lease, rather than buy, specialized legal talent remains
true even if the legislature is fully prepared to fund all necessary costs.
Even a specialized legal agency, such as the Antitrust Division, recently recognized that "bet your company" cases require a legal
superstar and not simply a competent bureaucrat by retaining David
Boies in the Microsoft litigation.
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To this point, the case for use of a contingent fee has not yet been
made. But now add an additional factor to the example: successful
litigation is a long-shot, possibly a ten-to-one. Now, a politically accountable official faces real risks of appearing to waste public funds
on a "wing-and-a-prayer" lawsuit. Indeed, the risks would be even
higher if the official had hired an in-house staff to bring the suit because upon its failure, the official would have to fire the now redundant employees and would face criticism for both the costs and the
possibly mediocre litigation effort that was made. Predictably, opponents of the elected official would surface to voice these criticisms.
In this light, the greater attraction of a contingent fee contract is
that it provides the elected official with a no-risk gamble: heads, we
win and the state recovers its losses; tails, we lose, but we incur no outof-pocket losses and we hired the best people available. Viewed this
way, the contingency fee agreement is less an end run around the legislature than a risk sharing arrangement that allocates both economic
and political risks from the elected official to the party most able to
bear it: namely, the plaintiffs' attorney. Even if the plaintiffs' attorney
is made a political scapegoat for the loss, he is better suited to bear
this loss as a member of a nationwide bar than is a local elected official. In sum, the desire to avoid legislative oversight may sometimes
be there, but the greater motive for use of the contingent fee is political insurance-avoiding the probability of a large one-time loss on
longshot litigation.
The one respect in which the class action is different from state attorney general parens patriaelitigation is that the contingent fee contract does not control. Rather, the state or federal court must
determine a reasonable fee for the class. For the state attorney general, this is further and desirable political insurance. Indeed, to the
extent that one believes state attorneys general will be overreached in
the fee negotiation process, the argument could well be advanced that
the state attorney general should only be able to sue on a contingent
fee basis if the action is a class action in order to ensure judicial
oversight.
B.

The Risk of Political Impasse

Even if the legislature is circumvented by the use of contingency
fees, it is not disabled. It can still act to block the parens patriae or
recoupment litigation. The critical difference involves on whom the
risk of impasse falls. If an appropriation is needed to bring suit, a
minority faction in the legislature may be able to block it by any of a
variety of tactics, from logrolling to a filibuster. Minority vetoes are a
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common fact of political life in the legislature. If, however, a legislative appropriation is not necessary, then opponents must assemble an
affirmative majority to pass legislation. However, a legislature may
still block legislation as the Louisiana Supreme Court recently ruled in
upholding legislation that blocked an anti-handgun, parenspatriaesuit
by the City of New Orleans. 19
IV.

CONCLUSION

In the new marriage of public client and private counsel, substance
dominates procedure. This tour of securities litigation suggests that it
is the substance of state parens patriae litigation, not its procedure,
that should be controversial. Procedurally, the marriage of the private
plaintiffs' bar and the state attorneys general makes sense and creates
enormous synergy that is beneficial to both sides. The plaintiffs' attorney gains the legitimacy, credibility, and home field advantage that
only the state can confer, while the state attorneys general gain specialized human capital that they could not otherwise afford. Most of
all, the contingent fee means that the state is essentially compensating
the private attorney with lottery tickets. This solves most, but not all,
of the political risks for state officials and the residual risk is mitigated
if courts must approve the fee as reasonable. Not all attorneys will
want such compensation, but those willing to accept it become more
motivated and have their interests better aligned with their clients.
Even if imperfectly, the contingent fee system works to offset many of
the dangers that "pay-to-play" practices otherwise would engender.

19. See Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 So. 2d 1 (La. 2001) (upholding constitutionality
of state legislation retroactively blocking lawsuit filed by City of New Orleans to recover costs
incurred by the City as a result of citizen use of allegedly dangerous hand guns on the ground
that legislation fell within state's police power).

